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Abstract. The paper describes a new RNS modular multiplication al-
gorithm for efficient implementations of ECC over FP . Thanks to the
proposition of RNS-friendly Mersenne-like primes, the proposed RNS al-
gorithm requires 2 times less moduli than the state-of-art ones, leading to
4 times less precomputations and about 2 times less operations. FPGA
implementations of our algorithm are presented, with area reduced up
to 46 %, for a time overhead less than 10 %.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the residue number system (RNS) has been increasingly
proposed to speed up arithmetic computations on large numbers in asymmet-
ric cryptography. This representation allows to quickly perform addition, sub-
traction and multiplication thanks to a high degree of internal parallelism (see
state-of-art in Sec. 3). This nice property has been used for implementing fast
cryptographic primitives in both software and hardware systems. For some years,
RNS is becoming a popular representation in implementations of elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) over FP [31,14,11,8]. RNS is also proposed to implement
other asymmetric cryptosystems: RSA (e.g. [21,15,4,23]), pairings (e.g. [10,32])
and very recently lattice based cryptography (e.g. [5]). In this paper, we only deal
with hardware implementations of ECC.
RNS is a non positional number system without an implicit weight associated
to each digit like in the standard representation. Then comparison, sign determi-
nation, division and modular reduction operations are very costly in RNS. The
modular multiplication, one of the most important arithmetic operation in asym-
metric cryptography, is significantly more costly than a simple multiplication.
Thus, many algorithms and optimizations have been proposed for RNS modular
multiplication, see [26,1,18,2,14,24,12,9,27].
In RNS, a number is represented by its residues (or remainders) modulo a
set of moduli called the base. The base bit width denotes the sum of the bit
sizes of all moduli. For representing FP elements, the RNS base should be large
enough: the bit width of the base must be greater than the bit width of the field
elements. For instance, [14] uses 8 moduli of 33 bits for FP of 256 bits.
Up to now, every RNS modular multiplication algorithm from the literature
requires to double the bit width of the base for representing the full product be-
fore modular reduction. This is not the case in the standard representation where
efficient algorithms allow to merge internal operations of the product and reduc-
tion only using intermediate values on the field bit width plus a few additional
guard bits. Another current weak point of RNS is the lack of efficient modular re-
duction algorithm for specific characteristics such as (pseudo-)Mersenne primes
(P = 2` − 1 or 2` − c with c < 2`/2 for some `) in the standard binary system.
In this paper, we propose a new RNS modular multiplication algorithm which
only requires a single base bit width instead of a double one. Our algorithm
uses field characteristics P specifically selected for very efficient computations in
RNS. As far as we know, this new algorithm is the first one which performs an
RNS modular multiplication without intermediate values larger than the field
bit width (plus a few guard bits). It requires up to 2 times less operations and
4 times less pre-computations than state-of-art algorithms. In ECC standards,
the field characteristics have been selected for fast computations in the standard
binary representation (e.g. P521 = 2
521 − 1 in NIST standard [22]). In this
work, we propose a new direction to select parameters for very efficient RNS
implementations of ECC. We expect scalar multiplications in RNS to be up to
2 times faster for a similar area, or twice smaller for the same computation time
(other trade-offs are also possible).
The outline of the paper is as follows. Sec. 2 and 3 introduce notations and
state-of-art, respectively. The new modular multiplication algorithm is presented
in Sec. 4. The theoretical cost of our algorithm is analyzed in Sec. 5. Sec. 6
presents and comments some FPGA implementation results. Sec. 7 provides an
estimation of the impact of our proposition on complete ECC scalar multiplica-
tions in RNS. Finally, Sec. 8 concludes the paper.
2 Notations and Definitions
– Capital letters, e.g. X, are FP elements or large integers
– |X|P is X mod P and P is an `-bit prime
– n = d`/we, i.e. the minimal number of moduli to represent an `-bit value
– The RNS base Ba = (ma,1, . . . ,ma,na) composed of na moduli where all ma,i
are pairwise coprimes of the form ma,i = 2
w − ha,i and ha,i < 2bw/2c
–
−−−→
(X)a is X in the RNS base Ba, abridged
−−→
Xa when no confusion is possible,
and is defined by:
−−−→
(X)a = (xa,1, . . . , xa,na) where xa,i = |X|ma,i (1)
– Ma =
∏na
i=1ma,i, Ma,i =
Ma
ma,i
,
−→
Ta =
(|Ma,1|ma,1 , . . . , |Ma,na |ma,na )
– Similar definitions and notations stand for Bb, an RNS base coprime to Ba
– EMM is a w-bit elementary modular multiplication (e.g. |xi · yi|m)
– EMW is a w-bit elementary memory word (for storage)
–
−−−−→
(X)a|b is X in the RNS base Ba|b = (ma,1, . . . ,ma,na ,mb,1, . . . ,mb,nb) i.e.
the concatenation of Ba and Bb
– MSBs are the most significant bits of a value
– MM denotes the state-of-art RNS modular multiplication
3 State of Art
RNS was proposed independently in [29] and [13] for signal processing appli-
cations in the 50s. RNS is a representation where large numbers are split into
small independent chunks. The RNS base B is the set of moduli (m1, . . . ,mn)
where all mi are (small) pairwise coprimes. The representation of the integer X
in RNS is
−→
X , the set of residues xi = X mod mi, ∀mi ∈ B. In ECC applica-
tions, field elements of hundreds bits are usually split into 16 to 64-bit chunks.
Addition/subtraction and multiplication of 2 integers are fast operations in RNS:
−→
X  −→Y = (|x1  y1|m1 , . . . , |xn  yn|mn) ∀  ∈ {+,−,×},
where the internal computations are performed independently over the channels
(the i-th channel computes |xiyi|mi). There is no carry propagation between the
channels. This leads to efficient parallel implementations [8,11,14]. This property
was also used to randomize the computations over the channels (in time or
space) as a protection against some side-channel attacks [6,15,23]. Another RNS
advantage is its flexibility : the required number of moduli n and the number of
physically implemented channels can be different. A physical channel can support
several moduli and store the corresponding pre-computations. For instance, [21]
presents an RSA implementation over 1024 to 4096 bits.
Conversion from standard representation to RNS is straightforward, one com-
putes all residues of X modulo mi. To convert back, one must use the Chinese
remainder theorem (CRT). The CRT states that any integer X can be repre-
sented by its residues xi = |X|mi , if X < M (the product of all moduli) and all
moduli are pairwise coprimes. The conversion uses the CRT relation:
X = |X|M =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
∣∣xi ·M−1i ∣∣mi ×Mi
∣∣∣∣∣
M
. (2)
As one can observe, the result of the CRT is reduced modulo M , i.e. all integers
greater than M will be automatically reduced modulo M by the CRT relation.
In addition to {+,−,×} operations, some divisions can be performed in parallel
in RNS. Exact division by a constant c coprime with M can be computed by
multiplying each residue xi by the inverse |c−1|mi for each channel.
3.1 Base Extension
All fast algorithms for RNS modular multiplication in state-of-art use the base
extension (BE) introduced in [30]. It converts
−−→
Xa in base Ba into
−→
Xb in base
Bb. After a BE, X is represented in the concatenation of the two bases Ba and
Bb denoted Ba|b. There are mainly two types of BE algorithms: those based on
the CRT relation (Eq. 2) [28,25,18], and those using an intermediate represen-
tation called mixed radix system (MRS) [30,7,3]. In hardware, the most efficient
BE implementations in state-of-art use the CRT based solution [12,14]. Our
proposed modular multiplication algorithm can be used with both types of BE
algorithm. In this paper, we focus on the CRT based solution since it has less
data dependencies and leads to faster hardware implementations.
The state-of-art BE at Algo. 1 from [18] computes an approximation of Eq. 2
and directly reduces it modulo each mb,i of the new base Bb. One can rewrite
Eq. 2 by X =
∑na
i=1
(∣∣xa,i ·M−1a,i ∣∣ma,iMa,i) − qMa in base Ba, where q is the
quotient of the sum part by Ma. Then one has:
q =
 na∑
i=1
∣∣xa,i ·M−1a,i ∣∣ma,i
ma,i
 = ⌊ na∑
i=1
ξa,i
ma,i
⌋
. (3)
In order to get the value of q, the reference [18] proposed to approximate
the value of
ξa,i
ma,i
by using
trunc(ξa,i)
2w (i.e. a few MSBs of ξa,i). In Algo. 1, this
approximation is corrected using a selected parameter σ0. If X is small enough,
then the approximation is the exact value. Otherwise it returns either
−→
Xb or−−−−−−−−→
(X +Ma)b , and this is easily managed in MM algorithms (see details in [18]).
Algorithm 1: Base extension (BE) from [18].
Input:
−−→
Xa , Ba, Bb, σ0 (fixed as a global parameter)
Precomp.:
−−−−−→(
T−1a
)
a
,
−−−−→
(Ta)b ,
−−−−−−→
(−Ma)b
Output:
−−→
Xb
1
−→
ξa =
−−→
Xa ×
−−−−−→(
T−1a
)
a
,
−−→
Xb =
−→
0b , σ = σ0
2 for i = 1, . . . , na do
3 σ = σ + trunc(ξa,i)
4 q = bσc /*q = 0 or 1 */
5 σ = σ − q
6 for j = 1, . . . , nb do
7 xb,j = |xb,j + ξa,i ·Ma,i + q · (−Ma)|mb,j
8 return
−−→
Xb
BE algorithms are far more expensive than a simple RNS multiplication. For
instance, in Algo. 1, the CRT relation is computed on each channel of the second
base. This BE costs (na nb + na) EMMs. In the usual case na = nb = n, the BE
cost is n2 + n against n EMMs for a simple multiplication.
3.2 RNS Montgomery Modular Multiplication
As far as we know, the best state-of-art RNS modular multiplication has been
proposed in [26] (presented Algo. 2). It is an adaptation for RNS of the Mont-
gomery modular multiplication [20], originally in radix-2. Various optimizations
have been proposed in [12,14] (factorization of some products by constants).
Algorithm 2: RNS Montgomery Reduction from [26].
Input: (
−−→
Xa ,
−−→
Xb ), (
−→
Ya ,
−→
Yb )
Precomp.: (
−→
Pa ,
−→
Pb ),
−−−−−−→
(−P−1)a ,
−−−−−→
(M−1a )b
Output:
−→
S =
−−−−−−−−−−−→∣∣∣XY |M−1|P ∣∣∣
P
+ δ
−→
P in Ba and Bb with δ ∈ {0, 1, 2}
1
−→
Ua ←
−−→
Xa ×
−→
Ya ,
−→
Ub ←
−−→
Xb ×
−→
Yb
2
−−→
Qa ←
−→
Ua ×
−−−−−−→
(−P−1)a
3
−→
Qb ← BE
(−−→
Qa ,Ba,Bb
)
4
−→
Rb ←
−→
Ub +
−→
Qb ×
−→
Pb
5
−→
Sb ←
−→
Rb ×
−−−−−→
(M−1a )b
6
−→
Sa ← BE
(−→
Sb ,Bb,Ba
)
7 return (
−→
Sa ,
−→
Sb )
The first step of Algo. 2 computes XY on Ba and Bb. This full product re-
quires a total bit width of 2nw bits. Then, we need to perform a multiplication
modulo Ma and an exact division by Ma, which is analogous to modular re-
duction and division by 2r in the classic Montgomery multiplication. However,
modular reduction by Ma is only easy in Ba (thanks to Eq. (2)) and the exact
division by Ma is only easy in Bb (which is coprime with Ba). Then 2 BEs are
required at lines 3 and 6. The result is given in the 2 bases, and is less than
3P (with BE from [18]). Using optimizations from [12] and [14], the MM costs
2na nb + 2na + 2nb EMMs (or when na = nb = n one has 2n
2 + 4n).
4 Proposed RNS Modular Multiplication Algorithm
Our proposed RNS modular multiplication algorithm, called single base modular
multiplication (SBMM) relies on two main ideas. First, instead of working on in-
termediate values represented on two “full” n-moduli RNS bases, it works with
only two half-bases Ba and Bb of na = nb = n/2 moduli. It reduces the leading
term of the computation cost from n2 to n
2
4 EMMs for a BE. Second, we select
the field characteristic P = M2a − 2 in order to use these half-bases efficiently,
and reduce the computation cost of the RNS modular multiplication from 2n2
to n2 EMMs. This type of P can be seen as analogous to Mersenne primes (2`− 1)
for the binary representation.
4.1 Decomposition of the Operands
In order to decompose the operands, we use a similar method than the one
presented in [9]. Algo. 3 decomposes the integer X represented by
−−−→
Xa|b on
the concatenation of both half-bases. The Split function returns
−−−−−→
(Kx)a|b and−−−−−→
(Rx)a|b such that
−−−→
Xa|b =
−−−−−→
(Kx)a|b ×
−−−−−→
(Ma)a|b +
−−−−−→
(Rx)a|b , i.e. the quotient and
the remainder of X by Ma. Using P = M
2
a − 2, we have Ma =
⌈√
P
⌉
and Split
divides X of nw bits into the two integers Kx and Rx of
n
2w bits.
Algorithm 3: Proposed decomposition algorithm (Split).
Input:
−−−→
Xa|b
Precomp.:
−−−−−−→(
M−1a
)
b
Output:
−−−−−→
(Kx)a|b ,
−−−−−→
(Rx)a|b with
−−−→
Xa|b =
−−−−−→
(Kx)a|b ×
−−−−−−→
(Ma)a|b +
−−−−−→
(Rx)a|b
1
−−−−→
(Rx)b ← BE
(−−−−→
(Rx)a ,Ba,Bb
)
2
−−−−→
(Kx)b ←
(−−→
Xb −
−−−−→
(Rx)b
)
×−−−−−−→(M−1a )b
3 if
−−−−→
(Kx)b =
−−→−1 then
4
−−−−→
(Kx)b ←
−→
0
5
−−−−→
(Rx)b ←
−−−−→
(Rx)b −
−−−−→
(Ma)b
6
−−−−→
(Kx)a ← BE
(−−−−→
(Kx)b ,Bb,Ba
)
7 return
−−−−−→
(Kx)a|b ,
−−−−−→
(Rx)a|b
At line 1 of Algo. 3, a BE computes Rx = |X|Ma in Bb (thanks to CRT).
Then, line 2 computes the quotient Kx of the decomposition by dividing by Ma
(in base Bb). Finally Kx is converted from Bb to Ba and the algorithm returns
(Kx, Rx) in both bases.
Lines 3 to 5 in Algo. 3 are required due to the approximation in the BE
algorithm from [18] for efficient hardware implementation. As seen in Sec. 3.1,−−−−→
(Rx)b is either Rx or Rx + Ma in base Bb. If an approximation error occurs,
actually (K ′x, R
′
x) = (Kx−1, Rx+Ma) is computed. It still satisfies X = K ′xMa+
R′x, and adds one bit to Rx (i.e., R
′
x < 2Ma). Line 3 checks Kx = −1 in base
Bb since this case is not compatible with BE from [18]. This test can be easily
performed in Bb, but ambiguity remains for Kx = −1 and Kx = Mb − 1. To
avoid this ambiguity, we select Mb > Ma, then (Mb − 1)Ma ≥ M2a > P and it
ensures Kx < Mb − 1. Then lines 4–5 set Kx = 0 and subtract Ma to Rx.
Random FP elements have a probability 2−`/2 to be less than Ma (i.e. less
than
√
P ). On the minimum field size in standards [22] ` = 160 bits, the prob-
ability to perform the correction at lines 4–5 is 2−80. Then, the implementation
of this test can be highly optimized with a very low probability of pipeline stall.
The theoretical cost of Algo. 3 is analyzed in Sec. 5. Algorithm Split mainly
costs 2 “small” BEs between half bases i.e. n
2
2 EMMs.
4.2 Proposed RNS Modular Multiplication SBMM
Our SBMM algorithm is presented at Algo. 4. We decompose X ∈ FP into the
pair (Kx, Rx) directly from
−→
X using Split. To recover X from (Kx, Rx), it is
sufficient to compute KxMa +Rx in both half bases Ba and Bb. The product X
by Y decomposed as (Kx, Rx) and (Ky, Ry) gives:
XY ≡ (KxMa +Rx) · (KyMa +Ry) mod P
≡ KxKyM2a + (KxRy +KyRx)Ma +RxRy mod P
≡ 2KxKy +RxRy + (KxRy +KyRx)Ma mod P
≡ 2KxKy +RxRy + (KxKy +RxRy − (Kx −Rx)(Ky −Ry))Ma mod P
≡ U + VMa mod P .
The first line of the previous equation is the definition of the (Kx, Rx) de-
composition. The next line uses M2a = 2 mod P . Then we reduce the number
of multiplications thanks to the Karatsuba-Ofman trick [17]. Finally we define
U = (2KxKy + RxRy) and V = (KxRy + KyRx). By definition Kx, Ky, Rx
and Ry are less than Ma, thus U, V < 3M
2
a . The values U and V must be
representable in the base Ba|b, so we need at least 3M2a < MaMb.
However U + VMa is too large for Ba|b, thus Split is used a second time. It
gives the decompositions (Ku, Ru) and (Kv, Rv) then:
XY ≡ U + VMa mod P
≡ KuMa +Ru +KvM2a +RvMa mod P
≡ (Ku +Rv)Ma +Ru + 2Kv mod P
≡ KzMa +Rz mod P.
Algorithm 4: Proposed Single Base Modular Multiplication (SBMM).
Parameters: Ba such that M2a = P + 2 and Bb such that Mb > 6Ma
Input:
−−−−−→
(Kx)a|b ,
−−−−−→
(Rx)a|b ,
−−−−−→
(Ky)a|b ,
−−−−−→
(Ry)a|b with Kx, Rx, Ky, Ry < Ma
Output:
−−−−−→
(Kz)a|b ,
−−−−−→
(Rz)a|b with Kz < 5Ma and Rz < 6Ma
1
−−→
Ua|b ←
−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2KxKy +RxRy
2
−−→
Va|b ←
−−−−−−−−−−−→
KxRy +RxKy
3
(−−−−−→
(Ku)a|b ,
−−−−−→
(Ru)a|b
)
← Split(−−→Ua|b )
4
(−−−−−→
(Kv)a|b ,
−−−−−→
(Rv)a|b
)
← Split(−−→Va|b )
5 return
(−−−−−−−−−−→
(Ku +Rv)a|b ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(2 ·Kv +Ru)a|b
)
Using the property M2a ≡ 2 mod P , we can compute Kz and Rz which is
the decomposition of XY mod P . From U < 3M2a and V < 2M
2
a , one can see
that Kz < 4Ma and Rz < 5Ma. The decomposition of the Z = XY mod P is
KzMa +Rz < 5P (i.e., this is equivalent to have Z ∈ [0, 5P [).
Our proposition is similar to the use of Mersenne primes in the binary system
where the modular reduction is performed by the sum of “high” and “low” parts
of the operand. In our case, Kx behaves as the “high” part and Rx as the
“low” part. In our algorithm, the split dominates the total cost. In the standard
binary system, the multiplication part is costly while the split is free (constant
shifts). The complete method is described in Algo. 4 where U, V are computed at
lines 1–2, decompositions at lines 3–4 and finally Kz, Rz are returned at line 5.
Using the approximated BE from [18], we have Kz < 5Ma and Rz < 6Ma.
Then we choose Mb > 6Ma in Algo. 4 (instead of Mb > 5Ma).
In Algo. 4, the two decompositions using Split dominates the total cost
which is equivalent to only one classical BE. Then our algorithm requires about
half operations compared to the state-of-art one (see details in Sec. 5).
Our algorithm has been tested over millions of random modular multiplica-
tions, for ` = 160, 192, 256, 384 and 512 bits.
4.3 Selecting P = M2a − 2 for RNS Efficient Implementations
We choose to use specific forms of the characteristic in order to significantly speed
up computations. For instance, KxKyM
2
a mod P becomes 2KxKy mod P using
P = M2a − 2. We also tried specific forms such as P = M2a − c and P = dM2a − c
where c and d are small integers. The constraint for selection is that P must
be prime. For instance, using c = 0 or 1 and d = 1, P is never prime (in those
cases P is a multiple of Ma or Ma + 1). The specific form of the characteristic
P = M2a − 2 seems to be the best solution at the implementation level.
We wrote a Maple program to find P with the fixed parameters n and w. We
randomly choose odd moduli of the form ma,i = 2
w − ha,i with ha,i < 2bw/2c.
Each new ma,i must be coprime with the previously chosen ones. In practice,
this step is very fast and easy as soon as w is large enough (i.e. w ≥ 16 bits for
ECC sizes). Using several Ma candidates from the previous step, we can check
the primality of P = M2a + 2 using a probabilistic test in a first time. This gives
us very quickly a large set of P candidates. For the final selection in a real full
cryptographic implementation, a deterministic primality test must be used. As
an example for ` = 512 bits, it took us 15 s to generate 10,000 different couples
(P,Ma) of candidates on a simple laptop (2.2 GHz core I7 processor with 4 GB
RAM). For selecting the second base, Mb just needs to be coprime with Ma and
verifies Mb > 6Ma. As far as we know, there is not specific theoretical attack
on ECC over FP based on the form of the prime characteristic. In the current
state-of-art, the theoretical security of ECC is directly related to the working
subgroup of points of the curve, and in particular its order. This is why in the
NIST standards [22] are chosen very specific P (Mersenne and pseudo-Mersenne
primes). We propose to have the same approach for our RNS-friendly primes.
4.4 Controlling the Size of SBMM Outputs
Our SBMM at Algo. 4 returns values on a slightly wider domain than the one of
its inputs (i.e., Kx,Ky, Rx, Ry < Ma lead to Kz < 5Ma and Rz < 6Ma). In case
of successive SBMM calls, one has to manage intermediate values with increasing
sizes. For instance, computing |X8|P (i.e. 3 squares), one gets KX8 < 30374Ma
and RX8 < 42946Ma. Then the architecture parameters must be selected to
support this expansion. In practice, the bit width of the RNS base must be
large enough for the worst case of intermediate value. This can be done by
selecting an adequate Bb. As the number of modular multiplications in ECC is
very important, we must find a way to compress some intermediate values.
A first way to limit this expansion is to compute |X · 1|P using SBMM. Then,
the decomposition of 1 is just (0, 1) then U = Rx, V = Kx, and the compressed
outputs are Kz, Rz < 3Ma. This a simple but not very efficient solution.
Algorithm 5: Proposed compression of a pair (K,R) (Compress).
Input:
−−−−−→
Ka|b|mγ and
−−−−−→
Ra|b|mγ with K, R < (mγ − 1)Ma
Precomp.:
∣∣M−1a ∣∣mγ
Output:
−−−−−−−−→
(Kc)a|b|mγ ,
−−−−−−−→
(Rc)a|b|mγ with Kc < 3Ma and Rc < 3Ma
1 |Rk|mγ ← BE
(−−→
Ka ,Ba,mγ
)
/*
−−−−→
(Rk)a =
−−→
Ka */
2 Kk ←
∣∣(K −Rk)M−1a ∣∣mγ
3
−−−−→
(Rk)b ←
−−→
Kb −
−−−−→
(Kk)b ×
−−−−→
(Ma)b
4 |Rr|mγ ← BE
(−−→
Ra ,Ba,mγ
)
/*
−−−−→
(Rr)a =
−−→
Ra */
5 Kr ←
∣∣(R−Rr)M−1a ∣∣mγ
6
−−−−→
(Rr)b ←
−→
Rb −
−−−−→
(Kr)b ×
−−−−→
(Ma)b
7 return
−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(Kr +Rk)a|b|mγ ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(Rr + 2Kk)a|b|mγ
A faster method involving extra hardware is proposed in Algo. 5 (named
Compress). It requires a dedicated small extra modulo mγ , typically mγ = 2
6,
and the inputs are assumed such that K,R < (mγ − 1)Ma. To compress a pair
(K,R), one converts Rk = |K|Ma from Ba to mγ thanks to a BE at line 1 (this
BE on only one moduli just requires na operations modulo mγ). One can now
computes Kk =
⌈
K
Ma
⌉
modulo mγ . Since Kk is less than mγ − 1 and is less than
all moduli, it can be directly used in Ba and Bb. This enables to compute Rk
in Bb at line 3 without a BE. Now (Kk, Rk) is such that K = KkMa + Rk, in
Ba|b|mγ . Lines 4–6 perform the same computations to get (Kr, Rr). Finally, one
can use the property M2a = 2 mod P because (K,R) is the decomposition of
X ∈ FP , then we have:
X ≡ KMa +R mod P
≡ KkM2a +RkMa +KrMa +Rr mod P
≡ (Rk +Kr)Ma + 2Kk +Rr mod P
≡ KcMa +Rc mod P .
Using approximated BE from [18], we have Kc < 2Ma + mγ < 3Ma and
Rc < 2Ma+2mγ < 3Ma (using an exact BE, one getsKc < 2Ma and Rc < 2Ma).
Using SBMM on inputs in the domain K < 3Ma and R < 3Ma gives outputs
Kz < 29Ma and Rz < 38Ma, so it is sufficient to choose mγ = 2
6 to compress the
outputs back in the domain [0, 3Ma[. The main parts of the Compress algorithm
can be performed in parallel, on a channel dedicated to mγ . The cost of Algo. 5
is evaluated in Sec. 5 and examples of applications are presented in Sec. 7.
5 Theoretical Cost Analysis
As usually done in state-of-art references, we evaluate the cost of our algorithms
(Split Algo. 3, SBMM Algo. 4 and Compress Algo. 5) by counting the number
of EMMs while modular additions and other very cheap operations are neglected.
Below, we use the case na = nb = n/2 since it is the most interesting one.
First, Split at Algo. 3 is mainly made of 2 BEs. The multiplication by the
constant
−−−−−→
(M−1a )b at line 2 can be combined with the one by the constant
−−→
T−1a at
line 1 in BE Algo. 1, this saves n/2 EMMs. The test at line 3 is neglected because
the probability to perform lines 4–5 is very low and they do not contain any EMM.
Then Split costs 2 BEs on 2 half bit width bases or n
2
2 + n EMMs.
In SBMM in Algo. 4, we need 3n EMMs at lines 1, 2 and 5. Multiplication by 2
is performed using an addition. To compute the 4 products KxKy, RxRy, KxRy
and KyRx on Ba|b, we use the Karatsuba-Ofman’s trick [17], it costs 3n EMMs.
The 2 Splits at lines 3–4 cost 2
(
n2
2 + n
)
EMMs. Finally, our SBMM algorithm
leads to n2 + 5n EMMs, against 2n2 + 4n for the state-of-art algorithm from [12].
Compress in Algo. 5 performs 2 BEs from Ba to mγ , which costs n/2 EMMs
on Ba and n/2 very cheap multiplications modulo mγ , typically on 6 bits (this
type of small multiplications modulo mγ is denoted GMM). Lines 2 and 5 require
two more GMMs. Finally, 2 RNS multiplications on Bb are required at lines 3 and
6 for a cost of 2(n/2) EMMs. Thus Compress costs 2n EMMs and (n+ 2) GMMs.
Tab. 1 sums up the required precomputations for SBMM (including Split and
its BE) and Compress. Globally, our proposition requires 4 times less EMWs than
the state-of-art algorithm. Dividing by 2 the bit widths in a quadratic cost leads
to the 1/4 factor. Tab. 2 compares the different costs analyzed in this section
for state-of-art algorithm and our algorithm.
Table 1. Precomputations details for SBMM and Compress in EMWs (* denotes modulo
mγ values).
SBMM Compress
−−−−−→(
T−1a
)
a
: n/2
−−−−−−→
(−Ma)b : n/2
−−−−−−−−−−−→(−Ma × T−1b )b : n/2−−−−−−−−−→(
−1
ma,iMb,j
)
b
: n2/4
−−−−−→(
T−1b
)
b
: n/2 |Ma,i|mγ : n/2*−−−−−−→(
Mb,j
Ma
)
b
: n/2
−−−−−−→
(−Mb)a : n/2 |−Ma|mγ : 1*−−−−−→
(Tb,i)a : n
2/4
−−−−→
(Tb)b : n/2
∣∣M−1a ∣∣mγ : 1*
Table 2. Cost summary for main operations and precomputations for our solution and
the state-of-art one.
Algorithms MM [12] SBMM SBMM + Compress
Operations (EMM) 2n2 + 4n n2 + 5n (n2 + 7n) EMM + (n+ 2) GMM
Precomputations (EMW) 2n2 + 10n n
2
2
+ 3n n
2
2
+ 4n+ 2
6 Hardware Implementation
6.1 Proposed Architecture
Our SBMM architecture, depicted in Fig. 1, uses the Cox-Rower architecture
from [18] (similarly to state-of-art implementations). A Rower unit is dedicated
to each channel for computations modulo ma,i and mb,i. The Cox is a small unit
required to compute fast BEs. Our architecture implements n/2 Rowers based on
the ones presented in [14]. A small 6-bit Rower is implemented to compute on the
mγ channel. This small additional channel has 2 different roles. First, for com-
putations over Bb, it adds the extra modulo mγ for Bb and enables Mb > 6Ma.
Second, it is used to compute modulo mγ in Compress from Sec. 4.4. In Fig. 1,
the white circles are control signals (clock and reset are not represented). The
small squares (in red) are just wire selections to extract the 6 MSBs of a w-bit
word. The bottom right rectangle (in blue) between the extra Rower and the
multiplexer just pads w − 6 zeros to the MSBs.
Our Rowers are implemented in a 6-stage pipeline as the one proposed in [14].
Then we designed our extra Rower for computations modulo mγ on 6 stages to
simplify synchronizations. We select mγ = 2
6 and all other moduli as odd values
to make this unit very small and simple.
Our architecture, depicted in Fig. 1, is close to the state-of-art one presented
in [14]. The 2 differences are the number of Rowers and the presence of an extra
6-bit channel. We only have n/2 Rowers in our architecture instead of n in the
state-of-art one. The control in both architectures is similar. We choose to only
implement n/2 Rowers to reduce the silicon area in this paper. In the future, we
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Fig. 1. Proposed architecture for our SBMM algorithm with an extra 6-bit channel.
will implement another version with more Rowers to speed up computations. Our
SBMM algorithm allows to use n Rowers (instead of n/2 in the current version) and
really leads up to 2 times faster computations while the state-of-art algorithm
do not lead to a doubled speed when using 2n moduli (due to dependencies). In
our algorithm, the 2 independent Splits and the other operations over Ba|b can
be performed in parallel over n Rowers.
Both architectures have been validated using numerous VHDL simulations
for several sets of parameters (see Tab. 3).
6.2 Implementation Results on Various FPGAs
We have completely implemented, optimized and validated both the state-of-
art algorithm from [12] and our SBMM algorithm on various FPGAs. The results
are given for 3 FPGA families: two low cost Spartan 6 (XC6SLX45 denoted S6
or XC6SLX100 denoted S6* when the LX45 is too small), a high performance
Virtex 5 (XC5VLX220 denoted V5) and a recent mid-range technology Kin-
tex 7 (XC7K70T denoted K7) all with average speed grade. We used ISE 14.6
tools with medium efforts. Below, we report results for a single MM and a single
SBMM without Compress. Currently, Compress control is not yet implemented,
we will add it and evaluate complete ECC scalar multiplication algorithms and
architectures in the future.
The selected parameters are given in Tab. 3. In order to compute a MM over
` bits using the state-of-art algorithm, one needs an RNS base with a bit width
slightly larger than ` bits. In state-of-art architectures, the fastest ones are ob-
tained for moduli with 1 additional bit (instead of an additional w-bit channel).
Table 3. Selected (n,w) parameters couples for the 3 evaluated field sizes `.
algorithms ` = 192 ` = 384 ` = 512
MM (12, 17) (12, 33) (16, 33)
SBMM (12, 16) (12, 32) (16, 32)
Both architectures have been implemented with and without DSP blocks.
The corresponding results are reported in Tab. 4 and 5 respectively. Parameter
n impacts the clock cycles count while w impacts the clock period (frequency).
Table 4. FPGA implementation results of state-of-art MM and SBMM algorithms with
DSP blocks and BRAMs.
Algo. FPGA ` Slices(FF/LUT) DSP/BRAM #cycles Freq.(MHz) time(ns)
MM S6 192 1733(2780/5149) 36/0 50 140 357
MM S6 384 3668(6267/11748) 58/0 50 71 704
MM S6 512 5457(8617/18366) 58/0 58 70 828
SBMM S6 192 1214(1908/3674) 18/0 58 154 376
SBMM S6 384 2213(3887/6709) 41/0 58 78 743
SBMM S6 512 2912(5074/8746) 56/0 66 76 868
MM V5 192 1941(2957/6053) 26/0 50 184 271
MM V5 384 3304(5692/10455) 84/12 50 118 423
MM V5 512 6180(7557/15240) 112/16 58 116 500
SBMM V5 192 1447(1973/4682) 15/0 58 196 295
SBMM V5 384 2256(3818/8415) 42/6 58 124 467
SBMM V5 512 3400(4960/10877) 57/8 66 123 536
MM K7 192 1732(2759/5075) 36/0 50 260 192
MM K7 384 3278(5884/9841) 84/0 50 171 292
MM K7 512 4186(7814/13021) 112/0 58 170 341
SBMM K7 192 999(1867/3599) 18/0 58 272 213
SBMM K7 384 2111(3889/6691) 41/0 58 179 324
SBMM K7 512 3104(5076/8757) 56/0 66 176 375
These results are graphically compared in Fig. 2 and 3 for area and compu-
tation time, respectively. Our SBMM algorithm leads to 26 to 46 % area reduction
(in slices) for up to 10 % computation time increase. When using DSP blocks,
the reduction of the number of slices is in the range 26–46 % and the number of
DSP blocks is divided by 2. Without DSP blocks, SBMM leads to 40–46 % area
reduction w.r.t. state-of-art MM (except for ` = 192 on K7).
Table 5. FPGA implementation results of state-of-art MM and SBMM algorithmswithout
DSP blocks and BRAMs.
Algo. FPGA ` Slices(FF/LUT) #cycles Freq.(MHz) time(ns)
MM S6 192 3238(4288/10525) 50 114 438
MM S6* 384 7968(8868/27323) 50 70 714
MM S6* 512 10381(11750/35751) 58 45 1288
SBMM S6 192 1793(2539/6085) 58 142 408
SBMM S6* 384 4577(5302/15160) 58 91 637
SBMM S6* 512 6163(6875/20147) 66 90 733
MM V5 192 3358(3991/11136) 50 126 396
MM V5 384 8675(7624/29719) 50 109 458
MM V5 512 11401(10109/39257) 58 106 547
SBMM V5 192 1980(2444/6888) 58 147 394
SBMM V5 384 4942(4696/16672) 58 125 464
SBMM V5 512 6466(6186/22411) 66 122 540
MM K7 192 3109(4060/10568) 50 200 250
MM K7 384 7241(7631/27377) 50 140 357
MM K7 512 9202(10102/35696) 58 132 439
SBMM K7 192 1999(2494/6368) 58 231 251
SBMM K7 384 4208(4649/15137) 58 162 358
SBMM K7 512 4922(6146/19269) 66 152 434
Using DSP blocks (bottom of Fig. 3) the computation time required for SBMM
is very close to the state-of-art one (overhead from 4 % to 10 %). Without DSP
blocks (top of Fig. 3), our solution is as fast as the state-of-art or slightly faster.
For the widest fields on the low-cost FPGA Spartan 6 devices, the MM area is so
large that it brings down the frequency.
7 Examples of ECC Computations
We evaluate the gain of our SBMM method for full ECC scalar multiplication
example. This example is used in [14] and [8] the two best state-of-art RNS
implementations of ECC on FPGA with a protection against SPA (simple power
analysis [19]). Both papers use formulas presented in Tab. 6, originally proposed
in [3], with (X,Z) coordinates and the Montgomery ladder from [16]. These
formulas use the lazy reduction from [3]: (AB+CD) mod P is computed instead
of (AB) mod P and (CD) mod P , separately.
Fig. 4 describes a computation flow example for formulas of Tab. 6. It shows
that each intermediate value can be compressed in parallel with a new SBMM call,
except for Z3 and I. In these cases, one has two choices: wait for the compression
function or add few bits to mγ to be able to compress more bits. To compress
the result of 2 successive multiplications, mγ must be at least 2
10. Moreover,
2 additional bits are required due to the lazy reduction. For this example, we
consider mγ = 2
12.
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Fig. 3. Time for a single modular multiplication with SBMM and MM, with (bottom) and
without (top) DSP blocks activated
Point addition (ADD) from Tab. 6 requires 6 modular reductions and 11 multi-
plications (5 without reduction). Multiplications by 2 are performed using addi-
tions. Point doubling (DBL) requires 7 modular reductions and 9 multiplications.
Each multiplication without reduction costs 2n EMMs using the state-of-art algo-
rithm and 3n EMMs using SBMM (to compute U and V ). ADD requires 3 compressions
for D, Z3 and X3, and DBL requires 4 compressions for H, I, X3 and Z3, since mγ
is defined to support compression after 2 successive multiplications. The total
costs for ADD and DBL are reported in Tab. 7 for both algorithms.
The reduction in the number of EMMs for various practical values of n (from [14]
and [8]) is: 25 % for n = 8, 33 % for n = 12, 37 % for n = 16, 41 % for n = 24 and
43 % for n = 32. In case we deal with the pessimistic cost assumption GMM = EMM,
the reduction lies in the range 23–42% (instead of 25–43 %).
Table 6. Formulas for Weierstrass form (y2 = x3+ax+b), RNS optimizations from [3],
(X,Z) coordinates and Montgomery ladder from [16].
Point Operation P1 +P2 (ADD) 2 P1 (DBL)
A = Z1X2 + Z2X1 E = Z
2
1
B = 2X1X2 F = 2X1Z1
C = 2Z1Z2 G = X
2
1
Formulas D = aA+ bC H = −4bE
Z3 = A
2 −BC I = aE
X3 = BA+ CD + 2XGZ3 X3 = FH + (G− I)2
Z3 = 2F (G+ I)− EH
time
A C B D Z3 X3 E F G H I X3 Z3
A C B D Z3 X3 E F G H I X3 Z3
· · ·
· · ·
ADD DBL
SBMM
Compress
Fig. 4. Example of execution flow using SBMM and Compress in parallel using formulas
of Tab. 6.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new method to efficiently compute modular mul-
tiplication in RNS for ECC computations over FP . This method relies on the
selection of pseudo-Mersenne like primes as field characteristic for FP . These
specific primes lead to very efficient RNS modular multiplication with only one
single RNS base instead of two for state-of-art algorithms. Our new algorithm
theoretically costs about 2 times less operations and 4 times less precomputations
than the state-of-art RNS modular multiplication. Our FPGA implementations
leads up to 46 % of area reduction for a time overhead less than 10 %.
Table 7. Operation costs (in EMMs) for MM and SBMM algorithms, various curve-level
operations, formulas from Tab. 6 and Montgomery ladder (ML).
algorithms ADD DBL ADD+DBL (ML)
MM 12n2 + 34n 14n2 + 32n 26n2 + 66n
SBMM 6n2 + 51n 7n2 + 49n 13n2 + 100n
In the future, we plan to implement a complete ECC accelerator in RNS
with this new technique and we expect important improvements at the protocol
level. In this paper, we designed an operator with reduced area but without
speed improvement. We will design other versions with a non reduced area but
significant speed up (or other trade-offs).
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